Libertarianism and Humanist Psychology

by Martin Andrews
Department of Psychology
St. John's University, Minnesota

retrieved from The Libertarian Forum VOLUME VI, NO. 3 MARCH, 1974

In the last few years a new movement has grown up in psychology. This movement is variously designated as humanistic psychology, the "human potential" movement, existential psychology, or, perhaps most commonly, the "third force". The phrase "third force" is used to distinguish this brand of psychology from the first two forces, psychoanalysis and behaviorism. This loosely organized group has its own professional society, the Association for Humanistic Psychology, and has, more or less, been given the official seal of approval with the formation of Division 32 of the American Psychological Association, the Division for Humanistic Psychology. There are many different points of view among the various members of the movement, and some of these differences are quite significant, but there do seem to be large areas of agreement among them, in addition to their common opposition to behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Some of the characteristics of this new psychology can be seen in the following partial listing:

1. A belief in man's free will and responsibility

2. An emphasis on experience as the basic datum of psychology

3. The idea that the person is or should be the main concern of psychologists

4. A commitment to the investigation of more meaningful problems than psychology has traditionally dealt with, even if this means a considerable loss of rigor

5. A belief in the moral necessity for the full development of human potential

6. A belief that man has considerable freedom from his past, and that much of his behaviour is determined by his plans and goals for the future

7. A belief in the natural goodness of man

8. The view that man is pre-eminently a social being, and can find fulfillment only through relatedness to others

9. The idea that values should be of great importance to psychologists

I take it as more or less axiomatic that libertarians have a valid interest in the views of psychologists. Since one's views about the proper kind of society are presumably based on one's view of human nature, and human nature is perhaps the chief professional interest of psychologists, it would be remarkable if libertarians, as social philosophers, did not have this interest. In any case, it would seem that libertarians have generally taken a positive view of the third force. A number of California libertarians, report has it, have become involved in the human potential movement. As another evidence of this, I note that the Laissez-faire Books catalog prominently features in its listings works on transactional analysis and gestalt therapy, both typical third force therapies, as well as the major works of Abraham Maslow, the father of the "third force." In light of this interest, and in view of the importance of arriving at a reasonable psychology for any sort of social philosophy, it would perhaps be useful to offer some critical commentary on the humanistic movement.

A real grasp of the meaning of the third force can probably best be gained by a consideration of its historical genesis. As indicated above, this movement arose largely as a reaction against behaviorism and psychoanalysis, and this reaction is intimately related to both its good and its bad points. Since the humanists' objections to behaviorism and psychoanalysis are rather different, it would probably be wise to examine these criticisms separately.

The criticisms directed against the behaviorists by the humanists seem to reduce to two. The first such objection is that behaviorism has trivialized psychology. By its rejection of such "mentalistic" categories as mind, reason, purpose, value, consciousness, and feeling, in the name of a spurious scientific objectivity, the humanists argue, the behaviorists have made impossible the study of any but trivial problems. The malign influence of behaviorism, they say, has forced psychologists to investigate only such phenomena as can be treated objectively, namely such inherently dull things as what influences the rate at which rats press a bar in a Skinner box. The study of more significant problems, they urge, is greatly needed. The second charge is that behaviorism views man as purely "reactive". That is, behaviorists view all behavior as having its cause in either past or present stimulation. The recognition of man's freedom and spontaneity, the humanists think, is needed in order to get a proper picture of the human person.

It is clear that one could hardly accuse psychoanalysis of being trivial, whatever its other sins may be. The charges against this doctrine, then, assume a somewhat different form. The psychoanalysts, the humanists say, paint a needlessly gloomy picture of human nature and its possibilities. If one might be permitted to caricature the psychoanalytic view of man, one might say that the analysts tend to see man as powerfully driven by anti-social sexual and aggressive needs kept in check only by the forces of repression and the necessities of social life, as a prisoner of his past, doomed to endlessly repeat the same neurotic script throughout his life, and that fundamentally there is very little that can be expected by way of alleviation of this unhappy situation. The humanists' response to this is twofold. First, they assert, this view fails to recognize the potentiality for goodness possessed by mankind. Second, they say, the psychoanalysts make the same mistake the behaviorists do, when they argue that man is a prisoner of his past. This is to fail to realize that man is free and can change himself.

The basic question, of course, is what we are to make of this series of assertions put forth by the humanists. It is clear, I think, that much of what the humanists hold is justified. It seems to me to be unquestionably true that the behaviorists' ruling out of "mentalistic" terms was a great mistake. The reasons for this, though, contrary to what many humanists seem to think, are for the most part scientific, rather than metaphysical or ethical. It is also true, I believe, that the study of values, and the explication of the concept of purpose are essential to any reasonable account of human behavior, just as the humanists assert. It is true, again, that the psychoanalysts' world-view is deeply depressing, at least to anyone who takes it seriously. This, of course, tells us nothing about the truth or falsity of the doctrine. Fortunately, though this is not the place to go into the subject, there is a great deal of evidence that the psychoanalysts were wrong about many things.

It seems to be the case, then, that the humanists have made a number of valid points at the expense of their opponents. Unfortunately, however, there are a number of places where the views of the humanists are open to severe criticism. I will here concentrate on four of them. These are: 1) the humanists' idea of freedom; 2) their influence on psychological thinking; 3) the political implications of some of their doctrines; 4) their utter disregard for the value of privacy.

Turning first to the question of freedom, it would seem to the writer that it is important to make a distinction between political and economic freedom, in the sense of freedom from coercion, and metaphysical freedom, in the sense of freedom of the will. The two concepts are logically independent, and to confuse them, as I believe the humanists frequently do (so do some libertarians), is to risk getting mired in some philosophical quagmires. It is often felt, for example, that it is only on the premise of free will that it makes any sense to speak of responsibility. This would seem to be the reverse of the truth. If an act is truly free, it would seem to imply that it is uncaused or random. It is difficult to see in what sense it is reasonable to assign blame for a random act. It is peculiar to express moral outrage at the outcome of the toss of dice, and illogical to expect censure to affect the next toss. Responsibility, then, is more compatible with determinism than with free will, in the writer's view.

A second, and in many ways more serious, difficulty with the doctrine of free will is that such a doctrine is ultimately inconsistent with any concept of human nature. If human beings operate under no constraints, save those of physical nature, then it is clear that they can make themselves into anything they want, and there is no obvious reason why one such choice should be better than another. Some of the existentially oriented writers seem to have seen this difficulty and more or less faced up to it. Sartre, for example, explicitly states that there is no such thing as human nature, and that we are free to make of ourselves what we will. The concept of the gratuitous, random act occurs in the writings of Gide, for another example. The concept of free will, I believe, is ultimately nihilistic and therefore incompatible with any vision of social life, libertarian or otherwise. The point to be made here is that the "third force" has a considerable intellectual indebtedness to the existentialists, and are infected, to that extent, with the existentialists' nihilism.

The second point of criticism of the third force is that their influence on psychological thinking has, in many ways, been bad. Because of their objections to the peculiar kind of rigor practiced by the behaviorists, they have all too often thrown out the concept of rigor altogether, and placed the highest value on subjectivity. Subjectivity, to be sure, has its place in science as in all other endeavors, but when one rejects the possibility of some kind of objectivity, there is clearly no way of settling disputes, and truth comes to be measured by intensity of conviction, the dangerousness of which I assume needs no elaboration. A related point is that the humanistic psychologists have tended to discourage the kind of analytic thinking that has been characteristic of experimental psychology at its best, in favor of what, for want of a better term, could be called synthetic intuitions. The chief point here is that analytical and rigorous thinking is, when all is said and done, a necessity for the life of the mind.

The humanists, as noted above, tend to believe in the natural goodness of man, his great potential for better things, and his freedom to achieve them. This aspect of humanism seems to be taken largely from the philosophy of Rousseau (as do several other aspects of humanism). The difficulty with a point of view of this type is that it tends to lead to utopian expectations and extreme dissatisfaction with present institutions. Dissatisfaction with present institutions, especially the government, the libertarian would be sure to add, is wholly justified in this age, as in any other that we are aware of, but if all human unhappiness is to be attributed to social institutions, then the justification for violent revolution becomes clear, and the way is opened for all the suffering that this would entail. It is often said that utopianism is a vital part of the human spirit. I can only say that as science fiction or fantasy it is unobjectionable, but as thought, it stinks. Most libertarians, including this one would favor revolution under some circumstances. However, it is clear to me that I would not support any of the revolutionary movements that seem to have any chance of success today. Ultimately I think the view of Nock and Mencken is a humane one, namely that when men are convinced of the need for liberty, it will be forthcoming with a minimum of bloodshed. This concludes our third point of criticism of humanistic psychology, its encouragement of utopian thinking.

The last point, that of the humanists' lack of regard for privacy, can perhaps best be made by an extract from an article in Psychology Today (September, 1969), written by a prominent philosophical psychologist, Sigmund Koch, and entitled, "Psychology cannot be a coherent science." (I would add that I agree with Koch's sentiments on humanistic psychology, but not necessarily with the major point of the article). In this article he discusses attending a symposium conducted by a humanistic psychologist, Paul Bindrim, the originator of "nude marathon group therapy". The extract is as follows:

"Bindrim's methods, for the most part, are the standard devices of group therapy. He was enthusiastic at the symposium, however, about a therapeutic intervention of his own inspired coinage that he calls "crotch eyeballing". The crotch, he notes, is the focus of many hang-ups. In particular, three classes: (1) aftermath difficulties of toilet training; (2) masturbation guilts; (3) stresses of adult sexuality. Why not blast all this pathology at once! Thus two group members aid in (as Bindrim says) the "spread-eagling" of a third member and the entire company is instructed to stare unrelentingly and for a good long interval at the offending target area. Each group member is given an opportunity to benefit from this refreshing psychic boost. Scientist that he is, Bindrim is unwilling to make a decisive assessment of the benefits until more data are in. But he is encouraged.

"Admittedly, Bindrim's is only one of many approaches in group therapy. But all these methods are based on one fundamental assumption: that total psychic transparency – total self-exposure – has therapeutic and growth-releasing potential... Every technique, manipulative gimmick, cherished and wielded by the lovable, shaggy workers in this field is selected for its efficacy to such an end...

"The human potentialists...are saying in effect that a world of private stimulations is unhealthy... In no time at all (they) have achieved a conception of human nature so gross as to make behaviorism seem a form of Victorian sentimentality."

Koch, I believe, has made the point about as well as it can be made. It is certainly true that the humanists have concentrated most of their efforts on the development of methods of group therapy, and that the idea of the private person often appears repugnant to them, perhaps even immoral. While I like to look at crotches as well as the next man – indeed my taste for this sort of thing may even exceed the average man's – it seems ridiculous to me to think that a viewing of "Deep Throat", for example, is a powerful therapeutic experience. One thing that can be said about nudity is that it is a great equalizer. As the dean of a great university once said about his faculty, "In their underpants you can't tell them from the students". If you are a great believer in equality, then, perhaps nudity is the proper form of dress for psychotherapy. A related point is that this need to submerge oneself in the mass that seems to be so characteristic of group therapies would seem to be inconsistent with the kind of differentiation among individuals that libertarians presumably regard as a good thing. Again, the view of human nature that seems to be typical of the "third force" can probably be traced back to Rousseau.

At this point a brief summary would seem to be in order. It appears that much of the inspiration for humanistic psychology can be traced to Existentialism and to Rousseau. Thus, the representatives of the "third force" get into trouble when they discuss the nature of freedom. Their influence on psychology has probably been more bad than good. Their belief in the natural goodness of man is surely untenable, and their emphasis on group therapy and total self-disclosure often seems to disguise a desire to get into situations where no social distinctions are made and one can lose one's identity in the mass. I would conclude, then, that Sartre and Rousseau are poor models for the libertarian, and that while the third force has made some valid points, the libertarian would be well advised to shop elsewhere for a psychology.

Editor's (Rothbard's) Note:
Professor Andrews' welcome article needs, in my view, an important philosophical corrective – one, however, which does not injure the main thrust of his position. The random concept of freedom of the will which he is criticizing is faulty post-Cartesian version. What we need to return to is the classical Aristotelian-Thomist concept of free will as self-determination, and emphasizing the freedom to reason. Particularly welcome is Andrews' critique of the fashionable and massive invasion of individual privacy in the name of "openness" and "humanism."